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War, Gender, and Civilians

Stability Operations in WWII:
Insights and Lessons
Raymond A. Millen
ABSTRACT: The stability achieved by the US military in the
European Theater of Operations after D-Day was the direct result
of good military governance concurrently deployed with combat
operations. The role of civil affairs in securing this stability has
been under-emphasized in analyses of these operations. But an
examination of the historical record of these events reveals the
necessity of a skilled, effective civil-military effort through civil
affairs/military government detachments, civil affairs specialty
pools, and G-5 staff sections.

D

uring the Second World War, the US Army gained extensive
knowledge of stability operations as it fought through
France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Germany. While stability
operations do not receive the same attention as other features of the war,
they were instrumental to Allied military victory. Indeed, stability in the
rear areas, largely a function of good military governance, was important
because it allowed the Allies to maximize combat power at the front.1
The US Department of War began preparations for military
government in 1942, recruiting and training thousands of civil affairs
soldiers for the liberation of Axis-occupied Europe and the invasion
of Germany. For the vast majority of soldiers with backgrounds in
civil administration, the training only further enhanced their skill sets
for civil-military operations. They served in civil affairs staff sections
(G-5) within all major headquarters, provided specialty expertise in
large civil affairs pools, and implemented military government in
task-organized detachments.2
Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower keenly
appreciated the value of the civil-military mission for the war effort.
Speaking to civil affairs soldiers a month before D-Day, he explained:
You have got to get the rear areas organized—electric lights, roads, and
supply—and you must keep them working and get them restored as quickly
as possible to some semblance of peacetime standards, so that they can
support to the utmost the armies that are fighting at the front. You must
take that responsibility for dealing with civilian affairs, whether it is restoring
public utilities or helping a nursing mother who cannot get milk, and if you

1. Raymond A. Millen, “Bury the Dead, Feed the Living:” The History of Civil Affairs/Military
Government in the Mediterranean and European Theaters of Operation during World War II (Carlisle, PA:
Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, US Army War College, February 2019).
2. F. S. V. Donnison, Civil Affairs and Military Government in North-West Europe, 1944–1946
(London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1961), 21; and Raymond Joseph Parrott, “An Education
for Occupation: Army Civil Affairs Training and Military Planning for Postwar Germany” (thesis,
University of Virginia, 2008), 58–59.
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don’t do your job, the armies will fail [emphasis added]. A modern army is of great
depth in the field. The fighting front of an army is a fringe of a tremendous
organization. . . . You are part of an Allied team. Always remember that.
Because your section of the army is called “Civil Affairs” you must not make
the mistake of thinking you are politicians.3

With three major campaigns as Supreme Allied Commander
behind him, Eisenhower understood that creating stability throughout
the great breadth and depth of northwest Europe would be a colossal
effort—and it was. During active combat operations, security activities
largely defined stability operations though the line between security and
stability often became blurred. For instance, restoring governance, law
and order, and the economy in local communities enhanced stability,
but at the same time it secured military lines of communication and
supplies from civilian interference. Regardless, the establishment of
military government was the most assured means for achieving stability
in the theater rear zone.4
This article explores the nexus between military government and
the achievement of stability in the European Theater of Operations.
First, it recounts the War Department’s rationale for stability as it related
to military necessity. Second, the article reviews task organization
considerations, which justified the investment in military government.
Last, it examines the implementation of stability tasks by civil affairs/
military government (CA/MG) detachments. Accordingly, this article
argues stability was not a by-product of combat operations; rather, it was
the fulfillment of a considerable civil-military effort.

The Rationale for Stability

As the War Department recognized early, the war would lead to the
occupation of territory resulting from the liberation of enemy-controlled
countries and direct invasions of Italy, Germany, and Japan. The War
Department reasoned that military necessity, along with international
law and humanitarian obligations, prescribed the employment of military
government for occupied territories. Doctrinally, military necessity
encompassed all activities in occupied territories that facilitated the
successful prosecution of military operations and swift termination of
the war.5
Since a military invasion disrupted local civil government,
international law obligated occupation forces to assume the functions
of civil authority, including the establishment of security and public

3. Cited in Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, United States Army in World War II: Special
Studies, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors, US Army Center of Military History Publication 11–3
(Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1964), 679.
4. Earl F. Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944–1946, US Army Center of
Military History Publication 30–6 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1990), 11; and
F. P. Huddle, Military Government of Occupied Territory (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1943), 7.
5. For a definition of military necessity from 1943, see: US Army and US Navy, Manual of
Military Government and Civil Affairs, War Department Field Manual 27-5/Navy Department Office
of the Chief of Naval Operations 50E-3 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 22
December 1943), 5.
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order; resumption of essential services; the provision of sustenance,
potable water, and medical care; and the restoration of the local
economy.6 Due to political sensitivities, the Allies described stabilization
activities in liberated countries as “civil affairs,” and in enemy countries
as “military government.” 7 But in execution, these activities were
virtually indistinguishable.
While the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration initially wanted
civilian agencies to administer occupied territories, senior War
Department leaders and Eisenhower successfully argued the overlapping
authorities of multiple civilian agencies undermined efficiency and unity
of effort, thereby compromising military necessity.8 The purpose of
military government was to impose temporary control of the populace in
order to prevent civilian interference in military operations, disruptions
to the lines of communication, pilferage of supplies, and civil unrest.9
In the end, both the Roosevelt administration and the War Department
agreed once hostilities ended, military government would transition to
civil control at the earliest opportunity.10
For Operat ion Overlord, Supreme Headquarters A l l ied
Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) adopted a different organizational
approach to civil-military operations than in the Mediterranean
Theater of Operations, where Allied military governments were ad hoc
arrangements, meager in numbers, and underresourced. Informed
by these experiences, SHAEF created a sophisticated civil-military
mechanism: numerous, well-organized CA/MG detachments; civil
affairs staff sections (G-5) in each division, corps, army, and army group
headquarters as well as at SHAEF; and a large civil affairs specialty pool.
On a practical level, the establishment of military government
permitted Eisenhower to optimize ground forces at the front thereby
reducing the traditional need to detach units for garrison and security
duties along the lines of communication.11 Additionally, military
government pursued two supporting goals. First, it sought to minimize
the diversion of military supplies and resources to indigenous populations
by restoring self-government, public safety, and the local economy.
6. US Forces European Theater (USFET), The General Board, Civil Affairs and Military
Government Organization and Operations, Study No. 32 (Headquarters, USFET, Frankfurt, Germany,
May 15, 1946), 3; Joseph P. Harris, “Selection and Training of Civil Affairs Officers,” Public Opinion
Quarterly 7, no. 4 (Winter 1943): 700; and Robert W. Komer, Civil Affairs and Military Government in
the Mediterranean Theater (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, US Army, 1950),
I-3, I-7.
7. John J. Maginnis, Military Government Journal: Normandy to Berlin (Amherst: University of
Massachusetts Press, 1971), viii; Ziemke, Occupation of Germany, 3n2; Cristen Oehrig, Civil Affairs in
World War II (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009), 2; and USFET,
Civil Affairs and Military Government, 1.
8. Parrott, “Education for Occupation,” 15, 58–59; USFET, Civil Affairs and Military Government,
3; Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, Chapter 22n20, 56, 139–41, 214n7, 215, 315; Ziemke, Occupation
of Germany, 11, 13, 15–16; Huddle, Military Government, 7; Oehrig, Civil Affairs, 7; and Komer, Civil
Affairs and Military Government, I-3.
9. Komer, Civil Affairs and Military Government, I-3; and Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 77.
10. Ziemke, Occupation of Germany, 11; and Huddle, Military Government, 3, 7–8.
11. Harris, “Selection and Training,” 697; and Komer, Civil Affairs and Military Government,
II-12–II-13.
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Second, it sought to utilize indigenous resources to support military
activities, such as abandoned supplies and equipment, local labor, and
human intelligence. Arguably, these efforts in combination contributed
to the massing of sufficient combat power along the German frontier
for the final offensive.

Task Organization Considerations

Graduates of the US School of Military Government and the Civil
Affairs Training Schools program reported to the European Civil
Affairs Division in Shrivenham, England, for assignments to CA/MG
detachments, G-5 staffs, and the specialty pools. For field deployments on
the continent, the European Civil Affairs Division assigned detachments
to companies within three European Civil Affairs Regiments (ECAR).
Designating the 1st ECAR for France, SHAEF then earmarked 2nd and
3rd ECAR for Germany.12 Experience in the Mediterranean Theater of
Operations demonstrated CA/MG detachments should receive logistical
support directly from tactical units operating in their areas of operation.
This proved prudent since the ECARs were unable to provide logistical
and often other support due to the geographic separation between
ECAR companies and their assigned CA/MG detachments, especially
during fluid operations.13
To underscore military government as a command responsibility,
SHAEF established civil affairs staff sections (G-5) throughout
the military echelons of command to administer the following
functional areas:14
• internal affairs: local government and civil administration; public
safety; education and religion; postal, telephone, and telegraph
services; public health; information and public relations; and
monuments, fine arts, and archives
• economics: food and administration, civilian requirements and
allocations, price control and internal trade, imports and exports,
labor (manpower), transportation, and public utilities
• dislocated persons, refugees, and welfare: liaison officers
and welfare agencies (that is, international organizations,

12. USFET, Civil Affairs and Military Government, 25–29, 35, 107–8; and H. McE. Pendleton,
“The European Civil Affairs Division,” Military Review 26, no. 1 (April 1946): 49–50.
13. Pendleton, “European Civil Affairs Division,” 49–50; and Donnison, Civil Affairs and
Military Government, 31.
14. Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 677–78.
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nongovernmental organizations, and indigenous populations and
institutions if available)
• legal: counsel, courts, and prisons
• finance: public finance, financial institutions, currency, foreign
exchange, financial intelligence, accounts and audits, and property
control
• reparations and restitutions15
The G-5 staff advised commanders on stability policy; issued theater
stability policy directives, proclamations, and ordinances; formulated
and reviewed stability plans; and supervised the implementation of plans
and policies.16 Further, the G-5 staff harmonized stability activities with
military plans, ensuring tactical units interacted with and supported
CA/MG detachments operating in their immediate areas of operation.17
The CA/MG detachments were the workhorses of military
government, operating in local communities, districts, and provinces.
Commanded by either a major, lieutenant colonel, or colonel, they
were tasked and organized for local conditions, focusing on the
following functions:
• local government administration
• public safety: police, fire, and civil defense
• public health: medical facilities, casualty evacuation, burial, and
disease prevention
• public utilities: energy, water, sewage, communications (for
example, postal and telephone), transportation, and refuse disposal
• public welfare: food, water, shelter, and refugee control
• legal: judiciary, claims, and prisons
• fiscal: banks, post offices, and depositories
• labor: burial, road clearance, building repairs, and supply in
support of military operations18
The size of a CA/MG detachment varied according to the level of
government administration and the size of the population. While the
average size was eight soldiers for towns, detachments for major cities
15. USFET, Civil Affairs and Military Government, 6–10; and Komer, Civil Affairs and Military
Government, I-11.
16. USFET, Civil Affairs and Military Government, 48–49; Komer, Civil Affairs and Military
Government, II-13–II-14; and US Army and US Navy, FM 27-5, 15–16, 45–50.
17. Donnison, Civil Affairs and Military Government, 22.
18. Harris, “Selection and Training,” 703; Rebecca Patterson, Revisiting a School of Military
Government: How Reanimating a World War II-Era Institution Could Professionalize Military Nation Building,
Kauffman Foundation Research Series: Expeditionary Economics no. 3 (Kansas City, MO: Ewing
Marion Kauffman Foundation, June 2011), 7; and Harold Zink, American Military Government in
Germany (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947), 59.
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would number well over 100 personnel.19 For Operation Overlord, initial
CA/MG detachments received pinpoint assignments in the Normandy
beachhead. As the beachhead developed, detachments expanded their
jurisdictions to cover several towns within a district.20 Once the front
moved onward, particularly after the breakout of Normandy (Operation
Cobra), specific CA/MG detachments remained in their assigned areas,
serving in the corps and army rear zones and eventually the theater
Communications Zone.21 Follow-on CA/MG detachments staged in
the beachhead, observing and assisting deployed CA/MG detachments,
and then followed along in the wake of the US military to establish
immediate stability along the lines of communication.22
To create efficiencies, the SHAEF G-5 staff established a specialist
pool for temporary assistance to CA/MG detachments and SHAEF
country missions. The pool of personnel possessed unique skills of
particular concern to the occupied country as a whole or a region of
the country. Some specialists deployed to address technical problems
beyond the expertise of CA/MG detachments and returned to the
pool once they had rendered assistance. Through the SHAEF country
missions, other civil affairs specialists helped provisional governments
reestablish national functions.23
Designed by SHAEF, country missions assisted provisional
governments of liberated countries and later imposed military
government on Germany. 24 Incidentally, Italy had no country
mission. After Italy surrendered and joined the Allies, Allied
military government regarded those portions of Italy under Allied
control as liberated. Since the Italian government lacked ministers
and civil servants until the liberation of Rome, Allied military
government administered the government. Also, SHAEF country
missions published country handbooks to familiarize CA/MG
detachments with Allied policies and facts about the assigned
country. SHAEF expected the country missions to govern assigned
countries until a national government assumed responsibility or, in
the case of Germany, until civilian agencies assumed responsibility.
As long as the conflict raged, their primary mission was to support the
war effort with host-country resources. As an index of greater tactical
cooperation, country missions fell under the command and control
of the senior military headquarters in the area of operations.25
19. USFET, Civil Affairs and Military Government, 29, app. 1, 1; and Coles and Weinberg, Civil
Affairs, 678, 742–45.
20. Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 725; and Maginnis, Military Government Journal, 17, 66,
89–90, 95–96.
21. Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 721.
22. Ziemke, Occupation of Germany, 149–53.
23. Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 14–15, 17, 769, 790; Ziemke, Occupation of Germany, 18–20;
and Zink, American Military Government, 59.
24. Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 225–26, 229; and Komer, Civil Affairs and Military
Government, III–13, III–15, III–17.
25. Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 677–78; Donnison, Civil Affairs and Military Government,
13–14, 18, 26; and USFET, Civil Affairs and Military Government, 50.
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For the final offensive into Germany, SHAEF envisioned the need
for hundreds of military government detachments following closely
behind the Allied offensive and deploying into predesignated towns and
cities like the unfurling of a giant carpet—the Carpet Plan.26 In addition
to the regular military government detachments, special mobile teams
(that is, I detachments) comprised of three officers and five enlisted
soldiers in two jeeps with trailers, accompanied divisions to establish
immediate stability in urban areas as a stopgap measure.27 They were
followed by temporary military government detachments during the
duration of the invasion and then by permanent MG detachments for
the postwar period.
Following Germany’s surrender on May 7, 1945, the widely dispersed
US military units and military government detachments in northern and
eastern Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Austria withdrew to the US zone
of occupation under the Static Plan. Under the authority of SHAEF’s
successor, US Forces European Theater, the Third and Seventh Armies
became the Eastern and Western Military Districts, and their G-5
staff sections transformed into the Office of Military Government for
Bavaria and for Baden-Württemberg, respectively.28 In accordance with
occupation policy, US Forces European Theater reduced the number of
military government detachments (to a total of 269 detachments) and
enlarged the size of detachments commensurate to their new mission.29
It is noteworthy no civilian agency ever relieved the US military
government of the occupation mission during or after the war.
Accordingly, the Office of Military Government for Germany, United
States “civilianized” the mission by separating military government
from the US military command and replacing military personnel with
civilians—many of them demobilized civil affairs personnel.30

Implementation of Stability Tasks

Civil affairs/MG detachments served as the primary instrument for
the establishment of local order and security while tactical units focused
on combat operations. These detachments accompanied combat troops
in the initial waves of the invasion, establishing immediate stability in
ports, towns, and cities. This section explores the manifold security
tasks CA/MG detachments undertook to stabilize their assigned areas.

26. USFET, Civil Affairs and Military Government, 96, 98, 111, 116–17; Ziemke, Occupation of
Germany, 164, 193–94, 310; and Zink, American Military Government, 58–60.
27. Ziemke, Occupation of Germany, 186–87.
28. USFET, Civil Affairs and Military Government, 38–39, 94, 98–100, 124–27; Ziemke, Occupation
of Germany, 321; Zink, American Military Government, 52; and Lucian K. Truscott, Command Missions:
A Personal Story (New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, 1954), Kindle.
29. USFET, Civil Affairs and Military Government, 117, 122; and Ziemke, Occupation of Germany,
310.
30. Robert Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company,
1964), 228–29; Parrott, “Education for Occupation,” 85; Truscott, Command Missions, 546; Ziemke,
Occupation of Germany, 423; and Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (Garden City, NY: Doubleday &
Company, 1950), 65–66.
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Aerial bombing, indirect fire, and ground combat inflicted
significant damage and casualties in towns and cities and caused
psychological paralysis among the inhabitants. As a result, the initial
task of CA/MG detachments was to spur local authorities into action
and to prioritize emergency efforts.31 Just as important, the implicit aim
of detachments was to provide a psychological boost to the citizens,
restoring confidence, optimism, morale, and hope for the future.
Accordingly detachments sought to avoid the appearance of charity;
instead they strove to create economic self-reliance and preserve
self-dignity.32 In this manner, military government minimized the
diversion of supplies, funding, and other resources from the primary
military effort.
An incoming CA/MG detachment established its military
government headquarters in the town hall or a suitable nearby facility
and raised the American flag to designate its presence. The detachment
commander met with or appointed a new mayor, directing him to
disseminate the theater commander’s proclamations, directives, and
ordinances, as well as prompting the resumption of local government.
At the same time, the public safety officer met with or appointed a new
chief of police to reestablish police authority. As a principle, military
government governed indirectly whenever possible, limiting its activities
to supervising empowered officials.33
Upon entering a town, the CA/MG detachment would conduct
surveys on the state of local government, shelter problems, medical
issues, food conditions, and available potable water as part of its initial
report to the parent G-5 staff. In response, the G-5 would dispatch
medical personnel, rations, material, and civil affairs technical specialists
to the communities most in need.34 This approach sought to minimize
waste and optimize the use of limited resources.
Identifying the availability of human capital was essential for
local recovery as well as supporting military operations. The CA/
MG detachment conducted a census to determine population size,
available labor, and important professionals such as doctors, nurses,
lawyers, judges, and bankers. The issuance of ration cards for food
distribution provided detachments with an accurate way to gather census
information. Establishing a labor pool by age, gender, and skills, all
under the control of the mayor, provided a readily available resource for
myriad tasks in support of the war effort. Greater knowledge of the local

31. Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 198.
32. Parrott, “Education for Occupation,” 48n134, 49; Maginnis, Military Government Journal, 67;
and Ziemke, Occupation of Germany, 435.
33. Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 193–95, 213, 735; Maginnis, Military Government Journal,
10, 13–14, 20–28, 33; Zink, American Military Government, 225–26; Komer, Civil Affairs and Military
Government, II-13–II-14, II-17, II-35–II-36; and Oehrig, Civil Affairs, 5–6.
34. Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 338; and Maginnis, Military Government Journal, 9–10, 20–28.
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professionals permitted the CA/MG detachment to draw upon their
capabilities as well.35
The CA/MG detachment identified, organized, and supervised
the labor details, such as longshoremen, burial parties, infrastructure
repairs, and rubble clearance, in support of military activities. While the
detachment provided funds from local banks or G-5 currency reserves,
it was important in terms of legitimacy for the local government to pay
the salaries of officials and labor details.36
Disease and potential epidemics presented a major risk to Allied
soldiers, the populace, displaced persons, and refugees. Civil affairs/
MG detachments conducted health inspections to determine medical
needs and identify diseases. Infectious diseases such as typhus, malaria,
venereal disease, and cholera were prevalent during the war, so quick
responses to outbreaks staunched epidemics. From the experiences in
the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, medical specialists undertook
preventive measures such as inoculations and DDT dusting stations
to kill lice. Civil affairs/MG detachments sought out local doctors to
assist in preventive measures and prompted the G-5 staffs to search for
doctors in prisoner of war camps to obtain their immediate release.37
Reestablishing law enforcement in local communities was critical
in order to relieve tactical units and military police of security tasks.
Under the supervision of the CA/MG detachment, the chief of
police reestablished an active police presence in the community. The
detachment vetted all police to eliminate Fascist, Nazi, corrupt, and
incompetent police officers. Often, the detachment authorized the
recruitment of police auxiliaries to secure banks, government facilities,
post offices, cultural facilities, enemy supplies and equipment, and
anything of value or importance from looting or wanton destruction.
Police provided traffic control and posted road signs for military
traffic transiting the urban area in order to forestall congestion and
wrong turns. Only in dire circumstances would the detachment request
tactical units or military police for security tasks. A recurring problem
was Allied soldiers disarming local police, so detachments requested
tactical commands inform their soldiers the police were under Allied

35. Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 193–95, 338, 723–24, 730–31, 733, 737, 758, 792, 794;
Komer, Civil Affairs and Military Government, II-35–II-36; Maginnis, Military Government Journal, 13–15,
17, 19–20, 38; and Damon M. Gunn, “The Civil Affairs Detachment,” Military Review 25, no. 6
(September 1945): 77.
36. Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 777; Maginnis, Military Government Journal, 19–20, 38; and
Gunn, “Civil Affairs Detachment,” 77.
37. Malcolm Gladwell, “The Mosquito Killer,” The New Yorker 77, no. 17 (July 2, 2001): 1–2,
4–5, 42; Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 307, 322–27, 325n10, 336, 338, 742, 758, 758n3, 792,
794, 813–14, 859; Keith Lowe, Savage Continent: Europe in the Aftermath of World War II (New York:
St. Martin’s Press, 2012), 7–8; Maginnis, Military Government Journal, 103, 134, 300, 344–45; Ziemke,
Occupation of Germany, 53, 195–96, 279, 293, 347; Norman Lewis, Naples ’44: A World War II Diary of
Occupied Italy (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 1978), 47–48; Rick Atkinson, The Day of Battle:
The War in Sicily and Italy, 1943–1944 (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2007), 247; and Komer,
Civil Affairs and Military Government, II-41.
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control.38 Also, CA/MG detachments established curfews and placed
movement limitations on civilians.
Further, the detachments established police checkpoints on
surrounding roads to enforce security ordinances. They issued
instructions for civilians to turn in weapons, cameras, binoculars,
carrier pigeons, and radio transmitters, which the local police collected
and secured. Detachments issued receipts for such items with the
assurance that civilians could recover them once hostilities ended.
These ordinances were necessary to limit civilian congestion on
roads and to deter espionage. Once the security situation permitted,
detachments instituted a pass system for civilians needing to conduct
authorized business such as commuting to work and labor details.
Detachments also ordered civilians to provide information on enemy
weapons caches or armories, supply depots, abandoned equipment, and
unexploded ordnance.39
Generally prison conditions were atrocious, so CA/MG detachments
inspected prisons and jails to ensure they conformed to international
law and norms. As such, detachment leaders retained the prerogative
to replace corrupt or incompetent wardens and guards. Additionally
detachments issued instructions to tactical commands, forbidding units
from arbitrarily liberating prisoners held in jails and prisons out of a
misperception they were all political prisoners.40
The CA/MG detachments and the G-5 staff sections also revived the
judicial system, opening criminal and civil courts as quickly as possible.
They sought out lawyers, judges, and legal clerks in local communities
and scoured prisoner of war camps for such individuals. United States
military tribunals focused on cases that affected the military effort, such
as the black market, curfew violations, theft of military supplies, and
attacks on the military. The civil courts handled the majority of criminal
and civil cases.41
As a matter of policy, CA/MG detachments closed banks, post
offices, and other financial institutions to prevent withdrawals by the
enemy government, criminal organizations, and anxious civilians.
Once detachments accounted for the financial assets, they reopened
these facilities at the earliest opportunity for the resumption of local
government and economic activities. Accordingly, local governments
renewed revenue collection as the local economy recovered. Often,
detachments advanced money to pay the salaries for civil servants,
police, firemen, and labor, so as to keep government running and to

38. Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 193–96, 198–99, 377, 383, 459–60, 725, 730; Ziemke,
Occupation of Germany, 146, 146n24; Komer, Civil Affairs and Military Government, II-35–II-36, II-43–
II-44; and Maginnis, Military Government Journal, 9–11, 19–20, 99.
39. Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 193–94, 735–36, 814–15, 817.
40. Komer, Civil Affairs and Military Government, II-39–II-40.
41. Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 206–7, 701–2, 772–73; Komer, Civil Affairs and Military
Government, II-38–II-39; and Zink, American Military Government, 109.
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restart the local economy. Nonetheless, this “seed money” was only a
temporary expedient until banking and revenue collection resumed.42
The black market proved to be a significant and continual problem
throughout the war. Theft of army supplies deprived the military of
scarce resources for the war effort. For example in Italy, an estimated
30 percent of incoming supplies were pilfered and sold on the black
market.43 Detachments discovered Axis governments had disrupted
local economies by diverting food, livestock, and equipment for their
war effort. Farmers in particular hoarded food and sold it on the
black market.
Thus the main goal for detachments was to create economic selfsufficiency in order to ameliorate humanitarian assistance. Detachments
undertook measures to regenerate local economies, such as ensuring
farmers and fishermen could get their products to markets, fixing prices
temporarily to combat black market prices, and discouraging hoarding.
Further, local police and military police executed raids on suspected
black market rings to curb that practice.44
As a matter of restoring self-sufficiency and local economies,
CA/MG detachments inspected public utilities, such as water, electricity,
gas, and sewage, for damage and repair. At times, repairs were easily
done once parts became available. In other instances, damage was more
extensive and required expertise from the specialist pool. Nonetheless,
these detachments sought to exhaust local resources and solutions
before requesting assistance from the G-5 staff to limit dependency on
the Allies and minimize a drain on Allied resources.45
Detachments inventoried captured supplies to determine the
value of these supplies for supporting military operations, provided
the G-5 staff section with the inventory lists, and notified the Counter
Intelligence Corps of captured documents and mail. Generally, tactical
commands placed the highest value on fuel and cargo trucks for
immediate use. Detachments provided all other captured supplies and
material not needed for the military effort, such as rations and medical
supplies, to the local communities. It is noteworthy that detachments
sold abandoned and captured equipment and tools to local farmers and
business owners to prevent their use in the black market and also to give
such items intrinsic value to the users. Detachments sent the proceeds
for such sales to the US government to defray war costs.46
Detachments organized motor pools from abandoned vehicles to
assist civilians with transportation or cargo lift needs. These motor
42. Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 196–97.
43. Atkinson, Day of Battle, 246–47; and Lewis, Naples ’44, 70, 82–84, 109–10, 116–17, 122–23,
125–30, 153, 164–66, 181.
44. Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 463, 725; and Maginnis, Military Government Journal, 54–56.
45. Ziemke, Occupation of Germany, 149–54, 253–54; Komer, Civil Affairs and Military Government,
II-41; Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 321–22, 338, 792; and Maginnis, Military Government Journal,
13, 99–105.
46. Maginnis, Military Government Journal, 18, 60, 95, 103, 110, 150; Gunn, “Civil Affairs
Detachment,” 77–78; and Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 147, 775, 810.

58

Parameters 50(4) Winter 2020–21

pools featured fuel points, garages, and mechanics at minimum
cost. Additionally, detachments arranged for the repair of public
transportation—buses, streetcars, and trains—as quickly as possible for
commuters, and CA organized motor pools in Italy as well.47
Local police intelligence on enemy officials, collaborators,
criminals, and friendly resistance groups proved invaluable for CA/MG
detachments and the Counter Intelligence Corps. Detachments met with
resistance groups to gain their cooperation and assistance with the war
effort. Paradoxically, while they provided invaluable assistance to the
Allies, resistance groups proved the most disruptive to stability because
they appropriated civilian property and undermined law and order in
liberated areas. Hence, detachments and provisional government liaison
officers persuaded these groups to disarm and demobilize. As a matter
of patriotism, quite a few of them enlisted in the French and Belgian
armies during the war.48
Detachments interfaced with the fire chief, inspected fire equipment,
and supervised the extinguishing of fires and rescue of people trapped
in damaged buildings. Frequently detachment personnel prioritized
firefighting to save lives, critical infrastructure, and issues of military
necessity. As a matter of course, detachments arranged for the repair or
replacement of fire equipment through the G-5 staff.49
Detachments also assisted military units transiting through urban
areas on the way to the combat front with temporary accommodations.
Accordingly, they coordinated with the local authorities to identify
facilities such as abandoned military posts, warehouses, and dormitories
and established billeting offices to accommodate units. This service
limited the displacement of civilians, potential looting, and incidental
damage to civilian property.50
Naturally the war resulted in the inevitable loss of and damage
to civilian property, so CA/MG detachments duly investigated and
provided restitution for valid claims. Often, Allied troops “requisitioned”
civilian property, which prompted detachments and G-5 staffs to
admonish tactical commands that such actions undermined relations
between civilians and Allied forces. After all, civilian cooperation rested
on the premise Allied liberators acted better than the Axis occupiers.
Going further, G-5 staff sections marked some towns in rear areas
as off-limits, established joint police and military police patrols, and
publicized the prosecution of miscreant soldiers to curb misconduct.
As the agent of Army provost marshal authority, detachments also
marked certain urban areas off-limits such as bordellos and bars, banned
the consumption of alcohol in towns, and prohibited soldiers on rest
47. Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 204, 207–8, 463, 810.
48. Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 737, 770–71, 797, 802–6, 811; and Maginnis, Military
Government Journal, 129, 131, 134–38, 166–69, 176–77, 180–81, 193.
49. Maginnis, Military Government Journal, 9–10, 14, 158; Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 338,
813; and Ziemke, Occupation of Germany, 253.
50. Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 792; Zink, American Military Government, 79–87; and
Maginnis, Military Government Journal, 14–15, 30, 36, 49.
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and recreation from carrying weapons. Prompt attention to civilian
sensibilities not only promoted good relations between civilians and the
military but also supported economic recovery.51
Another problem threatening military operations was the sudden
multitude of refugees and displaced persons on roads. Many civilians
simply sought to escape the fighting, but German troops also contributed
to the congestion by deliberately forcing refugees and displaced persons
toward Allied lines for the purpose of disrupting Allied offensive
operations. In response, G-5 staffs diverted dozens of CA/MG
detachments for refugee control, care, and swift repatriation. These
detachments guided refugees and displaced persons to roads away from
military lines of communication and accommodated them in abandoned
military garrisons or temporary camps with shelters. There, refugees
received rations, medical care, clothing, and transportation back to their
home communities.
Whenever the security situation and transportation allowed,
detachments collaborated with civilian agencies such as the United
Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration to assist in refugee
care. But generally detachments performed the lion’s share of processing
for these people. Literally millions of refugees and displaced persons
returned to their homes quickly as a result of the organizational
abilities of these detailed detachments.52 Achievements of the CA/MG
detachments were unassuming and largely unremarked upon by
historians who devoted more attention to military operations and
strategy. But the myriad problems they proved capable of resolving kept
tactical units on task, maintained the demands of military necessity, and
facilitated spectacular tactical and operational accomplishments by the
US military.

Conclusions

While future conflicts are unlikely to match the magnitude of
the Second World War, certain practices of military government
are worthy of consideration. Foremost, task organized CA/MG
detachments, CA specialty pools, and multifaceted G-5 staff sections
were notable achievements.
The War Department initiated US training programs early in the war
for civil affairs personnel earmarked for northwest Europe, highlighting
not only military government and technical skills, but also language and
cultural proficiency. In England, the European Civil Affairs Division
continued their training, ran practical exercises, and task organized the
CA/MG detachments for the anticipated missions.
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By deliberately deploying CA/MG detachments with the invasion
forces (both airborne and amphibious), US units were able to establish
stability on the beachhead immediately. While control of the population
was the immediate concern of CA/MG detachments, they also restored
local governance, public order, essential services, and the economy. This
approach prompted self-sufficiency, thereby minimizing the drain on
Allied personnel, supplies, and equipment. Moreover, the detachments
provided local labor, captured supplies and equipment, and intelligence
to military operations. They served as Allied representatives to the local
populace so as to bolster legitimacy and civil relations.
As the first responders for most nontactical incidents, CA/MG
detachments addressed labor disputes, the care of refugees
and displaced persons, and potential pandemics. International
organizations (the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation
Administration and the International Red Cross Joint Relief
Committee) and local government organizations could not operate
on the continent due to the nonpermissive environment and logistical
priorities. Thus CA/MG detachments repatriated the vast majority
of refugees and displaced persons on their own. Today, the United
States should anticipate circumstances, similar to those experienced by
CA/MG detachments in World War II, will prevent the participation
of international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and US
Government departments and agencies.
Lastly, military government set the conditions for the postwar
occupation of Germany and the recovery of Europe in general.
While the postwar conditions in Germany presented a host of
new challenges, the experiences and activities of existing military
government entities provided a practical foundation for the
next phase of postwar reconstruction. As such, military government
conducted reconstruction, economic recovery, law and order activities,
and political reforms. These long-term activities set the conditions for
the European Recovery Program—the Marshall Plan—and Germany’s
rehabilitation as a constructive European partner.

